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Articles
California Contractual Indemnity
RAY J. ARTIANO*
JAMES F. HOLTZ**
A thorough knowledge of how to interpret express indemnity clauses
in contracts and how to use themn in litigation are useful tools for
the litigation attorney, as well as for those practitioners involved in
the drafting of construction contracts, leases, and similar agreements.
Parties can agree by contract that the risk of loss will be entirely
upon one party to the contract, regardless of how the loss is caused
or whether the party to be indemnified was responsible for the loss.
Most attorneys, however, must confess to some trepidation upon enter-
ing what they may perceive as the arcane world of contractual
indemnity clause interpretation. This article, through historical analysis,
will attempt to illuminate the law of indemnity contracts in California.'
The historical overview will include a discussion of the Type I, Type
II, and Type III classifications established in MacDonald & Kruse
and applied by various California appellate courts. 2 These classifica-
tions are helpful in assessing the effect of a particular indemnity clause.
* B.S. 1975, Boston University; J.D. 1979, University of San Diego. Member, Stutz,
Rentto, Gallagher & Artiano, San Diego, California.
** B.A. 1975, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1980, University of San Diego.
Member, Stutz, Rentto, Gallagher & Artiano, San Diego, California.
1. See infra notes 8-60 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 21-60 and accompanying text.
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The authors will show, however, that the continued validity of these
classifications appears doubtful. Moreover, the current trend of cases
suggests the appropriate approach to the interpretation of indemnity
clauses is to determine whether the clause is general or specific, focusing
on the intent of the parties and not on the MacDonald & Kruse
classifications. 3 The authors then will analyze the active-passive distinc-
tion used by the courts to determine an indemnitee's rights under a
Type II or general indemnity provision.4 The article will demonstrate
that the indemnitee, if actively negligent, may not benefit from the
agreement and will conclude that the question of active or passive
negligence is primarily one of fact.' Finally, tactical and procedural
considerations in making effective use of express indemnity clauses
will be discussed.6 These factual and procedural considerations may
differ depending upon whether the indemnity provision is deemed
specific or general.7 To understand. the current state of the law in
California, a historical overview of indemnity clause interpretation
first will be made.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In the landmark case of Vinnell Company v. Pacific Electric
Railroad,' the California Supreme Court dealt with an indemnity clause
under which an excavation contractor "release[d] and agree[d] to
indemnify and save Railroad harmless from and against any and all
injuries to and deaths of persons, claims, demands, costs, loss, damage
and liability, howsoever same may be caused, resulting directly or
indirectly from the performance of any or all work . . . ."9 The agree-
ment was drafted by the railway. The main issue was whether the
indemnity clause operated to exculpate the railway from the conse-
quences of its own negligence, which involved the switching of railway
cars into the area of excavation.'" The California Supreme Court
very strictly construed the indemnity clause against the drafter/indem-
nitee railway and held that the language of the contract was not specific
enough to compel a finding that the parties intended the negligent
indemnitee to be compensated by the nonnegligent indemnitor." The
3. See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 61-123 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 63-123 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
8. 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340 P.2d 604 (1959). For a discussion of this case, see also Corley
& Sayre, Indemnity Revisited: Insurance of the Shifting Risk, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1201, 1202-03
(1971).
9. Vinnell Company v. Pacific Electric Railway, 52 Cal. 2d at 414, 340 P.2d at 606.
10. Id. at 413-14, 340 P.2d at 606.
11. Id. at 415, 340 P.2d at 607.
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court established the 'simple rule' that if the parties fail to refer
expressly to the negligence of the indemnitee in their contract, the
failure evidences the parties' intention not to provide for indemnity
for the indemnitee's negligent acts.' 2 The Vinnell court reasoned that
if an indemnitor is to be made responsible for the negligent acts of
an indemnitee over whose conduct it has no control, the language
imposing such liability must do so expressly and unequivocally.' 3
The first movement away from the simplistic approach of Vinell
came the following year in Harvey Machine Company Inc. v. Hatzel
and Buehler, Inc.'4 In this case, the California Supreme Court upheld
the indemnity clause although the indemnity agreement did not refer
expressly to the negligence of the indemnitee.' s The court stated:
The question is one of interpretation of contracts. If it can be
determined that the parties intended by their agreement to protect
the indemnitee against claims of damage caused by any or even all
types of negligent conduct on its part, such an agreement would
effectively accomplish that purpose.' 6
Vinnell was distinguished because of factual differences. In Harvey,
the claimed breach of duty on the indemnitee's part was not active,
affirmative misconduct, but merely passive negligence. Moreover, the
misconduct did not relate to some matter over which the indemnitee
exercised exclusive control.' 7 In distinguishing Vinnell, the court
appeared to focus on the parties' intent rather than mechanically
applying the Vinnell rule, which requires the negligence of the
indemnitee to be addressed expressly in the agreement. Significantly,
the court was influenced by the indemnitee's passive negligence. 8
Subsequent cases appeared to merge the strict construction approach
with the active/passive distinction. In Markley v. Beagle,' the
California Supreme Court expressed the rule as follows: "An indem-
nity clause phrased in general terms will not be interpreted . . .to
provide indemnity for consequences resulting from the indemnitee's
own actively negligent acts .. .[while] mere non-feasance [or passive
12. Id.
13. Id. at 416, 340 P.2d at 608.
14. 54 Cal. 2d 445, 353 P.2d 924, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1960).
15. The indemnity clause involved stated that "[Indemnitors] agree to indemnify and hold
harmless [indemnitee] ...against liability . . . for bodily or personal injuries . . . sustained
by any person or persons . .. arising from the use of the premises, facilities or services of
[indemnitee] .... ." Id. at 447, 353 P.2d at 926, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
16. Id.; see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Unified School District, 141 Cal. App. 2d
733, 738, 297 P.2d 752, 755 (1956).
17. Harvey Machine Company v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d at 448, 353 P.2d
at 926-27, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87.
18. Id.
19. 66 Cal. 2d 951, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
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negligence] will not preclude indemnity under a general clause."20
In 1972, the court of appeal in MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San
Jose Steel Company2 sought to categorize indemnity clauses into three
distinct types.22 According to the court, the first type of clause (Type
I) is one that provides "expressly and unequivocally" that the
indemnitor is to indemnify the indemnitee for, among other things,
the negligence of the indemnitee.23 Under this type of provision, the
indemnitee is indemnified whether his liability has arisen as a result
of his negligence alone24 or as the result of conegligence with the
indemnitor.25
The second type of clause (Type II), also known as a "general
indemnity clause," 2 6 does not address itself specifically to the issue
of an indemnitee's negligence. The indemnitor instead promises to
be responsible for the indemnitee's liability "howsoever same may
be caused," '2 7 "regardless of responsibility for negligence," ' 28 "arising
from the use of the premises, facilities, or services of [the
indemnitee]," 29 "which might arise in connection with the agreed
work," 3 "caused by or happening in connection with the equipment
or the condition, maintenance, possession, operation or use thereof,"'"
or "from any and all claims for damages to any person or property
by reason of the use of said leased property." '3 2 The MacDonald court
determined that a passively negligent indemnitee will be indemnified
under this type of provision because the provisions "manifest that
it is the intent of the parties" that the indemnitee's passive negligence
"was [one of the risks], if not the most obvious risk, against which
[the indemnitee] sought to be covered." 33 An indemnitee is not
indemnifed for his own acts of active negligence that solely or con-
tributorily cause his liability under this type of clause.
20. Id. at 962, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
21. 29 Cal. App. 3d 413, 105 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1972).
22. Id. at 419, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
23. Id.
24. Id; see also Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340 P.2d 604 (1959).
25. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 728; see also Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal.
2d 951, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967).
26. See infra notes 61-123 and accompanying text.
27. See Vinnell, 52 Cal. 2d 411, 414, 340 P.2d 604, 606.
28. See Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 42-43 n.2, 396 P.2d 377,
378 n.2, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 74 n.2 (1964).
29. See Harvey Machine Co. v. Hazel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 445, 447, 353 P.2d
924, 926, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286 (1960).
30. See Markley, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1967).
31. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 256, 466 P.2d 722, 729, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 185 (1970).
32. MacDonald & Kruse, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 728-29; see Morgan
v. Stubblefield, 6 Cal. 3d 606, 623 n.12, 493 P.2d 465, 477 n.12, 100 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1972).
33. McDonald & Kruse, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (opinion quoting
Harvey, 54 Cal. 2d at 449, 353 P.2d at 927, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 287).
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The third type of contractual provision (Type III) is one "which
provides that the indemnitor is to indemnify the indemnitee for the
indemnitee's liabilities caused by the indemnitor, but which does not
provide that the indemnitor is to indemnify the indemnitee for the
indemnitee's liabilities that were caused by other than the
indemnitor." 34 The court stated that under this type of.provision,
any negligence on the part of the indemnitee, whether active or passive,
will bar indemnification against the indemnitor, regardless of whether
the indemnitor also may have been a cause of the indemnitee's
liability." In other words, because the indemnitor does not promise
to be responsible for the indemnitee's liabilities caused other than by
the indemnitor, he will not be responsible when the indemnitee's
negligence contributes to the liability.
While the Type I, Type II, and Type III classifications advanced
in MacDonald & Kruse may help in assessing the effect of a par-
ticular indemnity clause, the California Supreme Court never expressly
adopted or approved these classifications. The court continues to look
to the intent of the parties rather than to a rule classifying the
indemnity clause.36 Various appellate courts, however, have continued
to apply the MacDonald & Kruse classifications. Some notable
exceptions, however, are discussed below.
In Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc.," Pylon appealed to
the supreme court from a judgment that they indemnify a general
contractor, Rossmoor Sanitation. Rossmoor employed Pylon to con-
struct a sewage pump station. In the course of trenching without
adequate shoring of the trench, a cave-in occurred which killed a Pylon
employee. The court found that the conduct of Rossmoor as a general
contractor was merely passive in nature, and that a "general indem-
nity" provision would be given effect.38 On appeal, Pylon contended
that the supreme court should overrule earlier decisions allowing
passively negligent indemnitees to recover under general indemnity
clauses. The court was urged to adopt a rule by which the right to
express indemnity under a general indemnity clause would exist only
when the indemnitee's negligence was derivative in nature, such as
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court, however, rejected
this approach.39
34. MacDonald & Kruse, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
37. 13 Cal. 3d 622, 532 P.2d 97, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1975).
38. Id. at 630-31, 532 P.2d at 102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
39. Id. at 631, 532 P.2d at 102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
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After an extensive discussion of what constitutes active as opposed
to passive negligence, the court stated in oft-quoted language:
In actuality, however, we do not employ the active-passive dichot-
omy as wholly dispositive of this or any other case . . . . While
adhering to the underlying distinction between active and passive
negligence which has long been accepted by the bench, the bar, and
the insurance industry, we hold that, as declared in Harvey, the ques-
tion of whether an indemnity agreement covers. a given case turns
primarily on contractual interpretation, and it is the intent of the
parties as expressed in the agreement that should control. When the
parties knowingly bargain for the protection at issue, the protection
should be afforded. This requires an inquiry into the circumstances
of the damage or injury and the language of the contract; of necessi-
ty, each case will turn on its own facts.4" [Emphasis added.]
Significantly, the court cited from MacDonald & Kruse, which was
not criticized or overruled." The Rossmoor court merely indicated
that the provision in the indemnity contract holding the indemnitee
harmless for any claims arising "from any cause whatsoever," when
the clause did not expressly mention the indemnitee's negligence was
a general clause.42
In the wake of Rossmoor, one appellate court has held that the
MacDonald & Kruse classification system is no longer tenable. In
Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,"3 the trial court construed
an indemnity agreement as a general indemnity provision and found
the general contractor only passively negligent, and entitled to
indemnity." The appellate court conceded that if MacDonald & Kruse
classifications were applied, the clause appeared to be a Type Ii."
Since the general contractor was concurrently negligent the indem-
nitee would be negligent, and thus could not recover from the
subcontractor. 6 Nevertheless, relying on the traditional Rossmoor
definition that a general clause is one that does not refer to the issue
of an indemnitee's negligence, and on the rule that an indemnitee
may recover if he is only passively negligent, the court upheld the
finding of the trial court that indemnity was owed.47 The court held
40. Id. at 632-33, 532 P.2d 103-04, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
41. Id. at 629, 532 P.2d at 100, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
42. Id.
43. 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1978).
44. Id. at 671, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
45. Id. at 673, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 673-76, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 426-28. Cf. Gonzales v. R.J. Novick Constr. Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 798, 810, 575 P.2d 1190, 1198, 144 Cal. Rptr. 408, 415 (1978). The court stated
that "[w]hether conduct constitutes active or passive negligence depends upon the circumstances
of a given case and is ordinarily a question . . . of fact .... " Id.
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that the concurrent negligence must be active negligence to preclude
an indemnitee from recovering under a general indemnity clause.4 8
The trend of the cases suggests that reliance upon MacDonald &
Kruse classifications is unwise.4 9 This is illustrated by a recent case
that has caused commotion in the insurance and construction fields.
In C.L Engineers and Constructors, Inc. v. Johnson and Turner
Painting Company, Inc., ° the clause in issue provided as follows:
Subcontractor agrees to save, indemnify and hold and keep harmless
Contractor against any and all liability, claims, judgments, or
demands. . . arising directly or indirectly out of the obligations
herein undertaken or out of the operations conducted by Subcon-
tractor, save and except claims or litigation arising through the sole
negligence or sole willful misconduct of Contractor .... 5,
The subcontractor contended on appeal that because California Civil
Code section 2782 renders void as against public policy 52 any provi-
sion in a construction contract that seeks to provide indemnity against
the "sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee," the
inclusion of that phrase in the indemnity clause was simply an effort
to comply with the statute." The subcontractor further argued that
the clause was sufficiently general, protecting against any and all
liability, that "arises directly or indirectly out of the obligations herein
undertaken or out of the operations conducted," so that the clause
should be treated as Type II and the active negligence of the indem-
nitee should foreclose indemnity.54 The appellate court stated that the
indemnity clause did address the issue of the indemnitee's negligence
and, therefore, was not a general indemnity clause." The court noted
48. Rodriguez, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 427; see also, Herman Christen-
son & Sons, Inc. v. Terrace Plastering Company, 61 Cal. App. 3d 237, 249 132 Cal. Rptr.
86, 93 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (holding that
the MacDonald & Kruse classification is no longer tenable in light of Rossmoor); Herman
Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering, 61 Cal. App. 3d 237, 248, 132 Cal. Rptr. 86,
92 (referring to the MacDonald & Kruse classifications, the court stated that because "this
interpretation renders the indemnity agreement illusory . . ., the fact that the judgment was
properly reversed because the indemnity was actively negligent as a matter of law, and ...
only two judges joined in the classification established, all lead us to reexamine that part of
the decision").
50. 140 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 189 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1983).
51. Id. at 1014, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
52. The courts have held that even when an indemnity clause is broad enough to provide
for indemnity, and the indemnitee is solely negligent, only the operation of that part of the
clause violative of California Civil Code section 2782, and not the entire clause, should be
invalidated. See Armco Steel v. Roy H. Cox Company, 103 Cal. App. 3d 929, 933-34, 163
Cal. Rptr. 330, 332-33 (1980); Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Construction Company, Inc., 20 Cal.
3d at 809 n.8, 575 P.2d 1190, 1197 n.8, 144 Cal. Rptr. 408, 415 n.8 (1978).
53. C.L Engineers, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
54. Id. at 1014-15, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
55. Id. at 1015, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
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that the inclusion of the phrase referring to the sole negligence of
the indemnitee was sufficient to preclude general categorization and
to allow indemnity even though the indemnitee was actively negligent.
The court phrased the question as follows:
[I]s there a legally significant semantic distinction between saying
"I expect to be indemnified against any and all claims arising out
of job related injuries, including those arising from my negligence"
and I "expect to be indemnifed against any and all claims arising
out of job related injuries except those attributable to my sole
negligence?" We think not."
The court distinguished the rule of Vinnell that required the agree-
ment to expressly and unequivocally refer to the indemnitee's
negligence. The court stated that to require that an express indemnity
clause be cast in rote form, as suggested by Vinnell, is to cause the
parties to "lie upon a procrustean bed of linguistic formalism that
inhibits the clear meaning of plain English.""
Apparently, the real intent of the parties in including the phrase
referring to the sole negligence of the contractor was to comply with
California Civil Code section 2782. Another disturbing facet of this
case was the rejection by the appellate court of the California Supreme
Court precedent established in Vinnell that the exculpatory clause must
be unequivocal. Interpreting the indemnity agreement in this case as
specific was contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority in
California and fundamentally unsound. Vinnell does not require that
the agreement be cast in rote form that inhibits the clear meaning
of plain English. To the contrary, the court merely indicates that if
a party wishes to be indemnified even for active negligence, that desire
simply should be stated. The case, however, does indicate the dangers
of relying solely upon the MacDonald & Kruse classifications in analyz-
ing indemnity agreements. Interestingly, the C.L Engineers case was
decided by the same appellate court that decided the MacDonald &
Kruse case."8
56. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
57. Id. at 1018, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
58. These two cases were decided by the California Second District Court of Appeal, Divi-
sion 5. See C.L Engineers, 140 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 189 Cal. Rptr. 824; MacDonald & Kruse,
29 Cal. App. 3d 413, 105 Cal. Rptr. 725; see also Armco Steel Corp. v. Roy H. Cox Co.,
103 Cal. App. 3d 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1980). The indemnity clause in that case read as
follows: "[Indemnitor will indemnify indemnitee from] any and all claims which may be made
against [indemnitor] by reason of injury or death to person or damage to property however
caused or alleged to have been caused and even though claimed to be due to the negligence
of findemnitee]." (Emphasis added). Id. at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33. The court held the
clause to be a general indemnity clause that failed to expressly and unequivocally state that
the indemnitee would be indemnified for its own active negligence. Id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 334.
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Current law has been summarized fairly in the recent case of Guy
F. Atkinson Company v. Schatz," quoting Rossmoor, as follows:
"Past cases have held that an indemnity agreement may provide for
indemnification against an indemnitee's own negligence, but such
an agreement must be clear and explicit and is strictly construed
against the indemnitee. (citation omitted) If an indemnity clause does
not address itself to the issue of an indemnitee's negligence, it is
referred to as a 'general' indemnity clause. (citation omitted) While
such clauses may be construed to provide indemnity for a loss
resulting in part from an indemnitee's passive negligence, they will
not be interpreted to provide indemnity if an indemnitee has been
actively negligent. (citations omitted) Provisions purporting to hold
an owner harmless 'in any suit at law' 'from all claims for damages
to persons' (citation omitted) and 'from any cause whatsoever'
(citation omitted) without expressly mentioning an indemnitee's
negligence, have been deemed to be 'general' clauses."60
Any remaining validity to the MacDonald & Kruse Type III
classification, which provides for the indemnitor to indemnify the
indemnitee for the indemnitee's liability caused by the indemnitor alone,
is very doubtful. Upon close examination, such an interpretation does,
in fact, render the clause virtually illusory because the clause would
apply only when an indemnitee's liability was derivative.
In spite of C. L Engineers, the trend of the cases clearly suggests
that the best way to approach interpretation of indemnity clauses is
to determine whether the clause is general or specific, focusing on
the intent of the parties and not the MacDonald & Kruse categories.
If an indemnitee wants to be indemnified for his own negligence, that
desire should be stated in the indemnity clause. If the indemnity pro-
vision does not provide specifically for the indemnitee's own negligence,
however, and the provision is determined to be a general or Type
II provision, the right to indemnification will depend upon whether
the conduct of the indemnitee is viewed as active or passive.
AcTIvE/PAssIvE DICHOTOMY
Despite the discussion in Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. 61
in which the California Supreme Court did not employ the
active/passive distinction as entirely dispositive of any case, all courts
clearly will use the dichotomy to analyze a general indemnity agree-
ment. The Rossmoor court specifically stated that when the indemnity
59. 102 Cal. App. 3d 351, 161 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1980).
60. Id. at 356-357, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
61. 13 Cal. 3d 622, 532 P.2d 97, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1975); see supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
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provision in a given contract is determined to be a general provision,
the indemnitee may not benefit from the agreement if he is deemed
actively negligent.6 2 The language quoted previously, therefore, would
appear to speak primarily to the issue of whether the provision is
sufficiently specific to provide indemnity even though the indemnitee
may be actively negligent.63
While the active/passive distinction originated in non-contractual
and implied indemnity settings, the distinction is equally applicable
to express indemnity agreements that are general or Type II indemnity
provisions. The distinction is critical because the indemnitee under
a general indemnity provision will be foreclosed from obtaining full
indemnity if his conduct is viewed as active."'
One of the earliest cases to discuss the active/passive distinction
in the express contractual setting was Harvey Machine Company, Inc.
v. Hatzel and Buehler, Inc.61 In Harvey, the appellant construction
contractors appealed from a lower court judgment that required them
to indemnify the plaintiffs pursuant to an indemnification clause in
their agreement. The appellants were to perform electrical installa-
tions at plaintiff's plant. While construction was ongoing, an employee
of the appellants fell into an open elevator pit. The employee brought
an action against the plaintiffs who demanded that the appellants
defend and indemnify under the provisions of the contract. 6 In af-
firming the lower court ruling that appellants were obligated to in-
demnify the plaintiffs, the California Supreme Court held that the
claimed breach of duty on the part of the indemnitee was at most
passive negligence. 67 The court noted that in this case the owner did
not continue to maintain independent operations on the premises when
construction was in progress and that the only breach would be a
failure to act in fulfillment of a duty of care that devolved upon
the indemnitee as the owner of land. 6
62. 13 Cal. 3d at 629, 532 P.2d 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. 453.
63. At least one commentator has suggested that authority exists for the proposition that
the active/passive dichotomy has no application to express contractual indemnity. See Corley
& Sayre, Indemnity Revisited: Insurance of the Shifting Risk, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1201, 1208
(1971). The commentators in that article rely on Del Real v. San Diego Gas & Electric Com-
pany, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1096, 89 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1970) for that proposition. Del Real stated
that the active/passive distinction would have no application to a case in which the indemnity
agreement expressly provided for indemnity for loss occasioned by the concurrent negligence
of the indemnitee and the indemnitor. The court stated that" the active/passive distinction had
no application to a Type I indemnity agreement. Id. at 1102-03, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
64. See Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Company, 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25
Cal. Rptr. 301, 309 (1962).
65. 54 Cal. 2d 445, 448, 353 P.2d 924, 926, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286 (1960). For a discussion
of Harvey, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
66. 54 Cal. 2d at 446, 353 P.2d at 926, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
67. Id. at 448, 353 P.2d at 927, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
68. Id. at 448, 353 P.2d at 926-27, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87.
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The appellate court case of Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina
Company" contains an excellent discussion of the active/passive distinc-
tion. The Cahill Brothers case, which arises in the context of an im-
plied indemnity setting, indicated that the contractor, Cahill, engaged
Clementina as an independent contractor to perform demolition work
for an excavation. In the course of this work, a pedestrian was in-
jured due to the negligence of Cahill's employee, acting in a dual
capacity for both parties. The injured party recovered judgment against
both Cahill and Clementina. Cahill then sought indemnity against
Clementina."° The appellate court, in holding that Cahill was not en-
titled to implied indemnity, found that Cahill's own conduct was suf-
ficient to preclude recovery.71 The court reviewed the development
of noncontractual implied indemnity and noted the following:
[I]f the person seeking indemnity personally participates in an
affirmative act of negligence, or is physically connected with an act
of omission by knowledge or acquiescence in it on his part, or fails
to perform some duty in connection with the omission which he may
have undertaken by virtue of his agreement, he is deprived of the
right of indemnity."
In finding that Cahill was not entitled to indemnity, the court stated
that Cahill's participation was active." The court noted that the Cahill
employee was present on the job as general superintendent, that the
employee was physically connected with the barricade by virtue of
his knowledge and acquiescence, and that he was actively involved
in construction of the barricade. 4 Moreover, during the construction
of the barricade, the employee was conscious of his obligation to pro-
tect Cahill's interests as well as those of Clementina, and was con-
scious of his obligation to protect the tenants, who were Cahill's
responsibility."' The court found that as a matter of law, Cahill par-
ticipated consciously and actively in the wrong to the plaintiff.7 6
In Price v. Shell Oil Company," the California Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of whether a passively negligent indemnitee would
69. 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
70. Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Company, 208 Cal. App. 2d at 374, 25 Cal. Rptr.
at 304.
71. Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
72. Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
76. Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
77. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1978).
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be indemnified under a general indemnity provision.7 1 In Price, the
Shell Oil Company leased a gasoline tank truck to Flying Tiger in
1958, and in 1962 Shell removed an original movable ladder, which
had been mounted upon the tank, and a replacement, which was built
by an undisclosed manufacturer, was furnished and installed on the
truck. Approximately two years after the replacement was installed,
the plaintiff was climbing a ladder when the legs split, causing plain-
tiff to fall and sustain serious injuries. One of the issues in the case
was whether Shell was entitled to be indemnified by Flying Tiger.79
The court interpreted the indemnity provision between Shell and Fly-
ing Tiger as a general indemnity provision,8" one that did not contain
language expressly and unequivocally requiring the indemnitor to
indemnify the indemnitee for liability or damages caused by the
indemnitee's own act of negligence. In the absence of a specific agree-
ment to protect the indemnitee against its own negligence, the court
argued that the indemnitor should not be required to indemnify. "
The court stated that to impose this type of liability, the language
in the provision must expressly and unequivocally require indemnifica-
tion so that the indemnitor is advised of the liability to which he
is exposed." In holding that Shell was not entitled to indemnity, the
court noted that to interpret a general clause as transferring the liability
for a defective article from the distributor, who places the article in
the stream of commerce, to the user or consumer of the article, would
violate the doctrine of strict liability and thwart its basic purpose.83
In MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Company,84
MacDonald, the general contractor, subcontracted with San Jose Steel
for the erection and fabrication of steel to be used in widening an
existing overpass on the Long Beach Freeway. San Jose subcontracted
the erection of the steel to California Erectors, Inc. During construc-
tion, an employee of California Erectors was injured when he fell
78. Price v. Shell Oil Company, 2 Cal. 3d 245, 256, 466 P.2d 722, 729, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 185 (1970).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 257-58, 466 P.2d at 730, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Vinnell, 52 Cal. 2d at 416-17, 340 P.2d at 608). Moreover, the court added
the following in a footnote:
In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result reached by their interpretational
efforts can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fail to refer
expressly to negligence in their contract such failure evidences the parties' intention
not to provide for indemnity for the indemnitee's negligent acts.
Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 258, 466 P.2d at 730, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (quoting from Vinnell, 52 Cal.
2d at 415, 340 P.2d at 607).
83. Id. at 258, 466 P.2d at 731, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 187; see also Widson v. International
Harvester Co., Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 60, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 147 (1984).
84. 29 Cal. App. 3d 413, 105 Cal. Rptr. 725; see supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
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from the overpass to the ground. The injured worker brought an action
against MacDonald, San Jose, and the State of California, and
recovered against MacDonald and the State." Cross-complaints were
brought with the State seeking contractual indemnity from MacDonald
and MacDonald seeking contractual indemnity from San Jose. The
lower court found that the negligence of the State was not active.16
The appellate court held, however, that the negligence of MacDonald
was active, precluding recovery against San Jose.8" The court affirmed
the judgment in favor of the State and against MacDonald." Although
the specific facts concerning the accident were not addressed by the
court, an examination of the court discussion is instructive. The court
held that assuming the agreement between MacDonald and San Jose
was a general indemnity agreement, conduct of MacDonald had to
be interpreted as active negligence.8" The court first noted that
MacDonald was actively negligent by failure to perform contractual
undertakings."0 Moreover, the court found that MacDonald had con-
tracted to:
(1) "keep [itself] fully informed of all existing and future State
and national laws and county and municipal ordinances and regula-
tions which may in any manner affect those engaged or employed
in the work ...and of all such orders and decrees of bodies or
tribunals having any jurisdiction or authority over the same"; (2)
"observe and comply with ... all such [rules]"; and (3) "provide
all safeguards, safety devices and protective equipment and take any
other needed actions, on [its] own responsibility, or as the State
Highway Department contracting officer may determine, reasonably
necessary to protect the life and health of employees on the job and
the safety of the public to protect property in connection with the
performance of the work covered by the contract." 9'
The court found that the agents of MacDonald were aware of the
construction order stating that when an elevation is twenty-five or
more feet above the ground and the use of safety belts and lifelines
are impracticable, safety nets should be erected; that the area in which
the employee was working prior to the accident was more than twenty-
five feet above the ground; and that more conventional types of safety
were impractical and that safety nets should have been used and, in
85. MacDonald & Kruse, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 426, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
89. Id. at 422, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
90. Id. at 424, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
91. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
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fact, were placed in other locations on the construction site.92
MacDonald apparently did not employ safety nets at that particular
site because of an inadequate supply of nets. 9" The court found that
because MacDonald expressly agreed, by contract, to provide
safeguards, safety devices, and protective equipment reasonably
necessary to protect the life and health of employees on the job, its
failure to provide the employee with a safety net was active
negligence. 94 Furthermore, because MacDonald was aware of the
problem and was aware that the employee was working in the area,
the court found that MacDonald was involved in a personal affirmative
act of negligence. 95
Another interesting facet of MacDonald & Kruse is the discussion
of the two different indemnity clauses contained in the contract between
MacDonald and San Jose. 96 In the contract, all rights and remedies
that were reserved to the State of California under the general con-
tract that MacDonald had with the State would apply to and be
possessed by MacDonald in dealings with San Jose. 97 Moreover,
the indemnification agreement that existed between the State and
MacDonald was a general indemnification agreement. In the contract
between MacDonald and San Jose, a more specific indemnity provi-
sion provided that San Jose would indemnify MacDonald, which would
be held harmless from any liability caused by San Jose, its agents,
or its employees. The clause was interpreted as a Type III indemnity
provision, which would preclude MacDonald from recovering if actively
or passively negligent. 98 The court in MacDonald & Kruse held that
the more specific agreement would control, citing the well recognized
rule that if a general and specific provision of a contract are
inconsistent, the specific controls the general. 99
An excellent discussion of the active/passive dichotomy appears in
Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc.'° The court notes that
whether the conduct is active or passive is ordinarily a question of
fact, although, in appropriate cases, the question is to be determined
as a matter of law.10' Examples of passive negligence cited by the
92. Id. at 424, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
93. Id. at 424, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
94. Id. at 424-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
95. Id. at 425, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
96. See id. at 421, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 421, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 730. For a contrary result on this same issue, see Indenco
Co. v. Evans, 201 Cal. App. 2d 369, 374, 20 Cal. Rptr. 90, 93 (1962).
100. 13 Cal. 3d 622, 532 P.2d .97, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1975).
101. See id. at 629, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
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Rossmoor court included (1) failure to exercise a right of inspection
over certain work and to specify changes,'0 2 (2) failure to exercise
the right to order removal of defective material,' 3 and (3) a failure to
discover a dangerous condition which was created by others.'04
Examples of active negligence by the court included (1) digging a
hole which caused injury,' 5 (2) supplying a scaffold that does not
meet safety order requirements,' 06 and (3) creating a perilous condi-
tion that resulted in an explosion.' 7
In Rossmoor, the trial court found that Rossmoor was only passively
negligent.' 8 Appellants contended that Rossmoor was actively negligent
because Rossmoor (1) furnished the plans and specifications accord-
ing to which the trenches were excavated, (2) retained the engineering
firm to prepare the plans, (3) approved the plans, (4) supervised per-
sonnel on the job site at various stages of construction to interpret
plans and to direct Pylon's work, (5) knew of, permitted and approved
excavation of the trench, (6) used hazardous practices not consistent
with good construction practice, (7) experienced difficulty with land
slippage and excavation collapse during construction, (8) never
requested a compaction report on the first trench, (9) conducted
dynamiting operations during which trucks and heavy equipment caused
vibrations, and (10) worried about delays in construction.'10 In holding
that active negligence could not be determined as a matter of law,
the appellate court stated that the trier of fact reasonably concluded
that Rossmoor had no supervisory personnel at the site of the acci-
dent, that Rossmoor had no knowledge that Pylon employees intended
to enter the unshored trench, and that Pylon was directly responsible
for the trench remaining unshored." °
In Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Construction Company, Inc.,' the
plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries that he suffered after
102. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Muth v. Urricelqui, 251
Cal. App. 2d 901, 911, 60 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1967)).
103. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, 202 Cal. App. 2d 99, 111-13, 20 Cal. Rptr.
820, 826-27 (1962)).
104. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal.
2d 955, 429 P.2d 129, 131-33, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811-12 (1967)).
105. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Morgan v. Stubblefield,
6 Cal. 3d 606, 626, 493 P.2d 465, 479, 100 Cal. Rptr. 1, 15 (1972)).
106. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Morgan, 6 Cal. 3d at 625,
626, 493 P.2d at 478-79, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 14-15).
107. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453 (citing Burlingame Motor Company
v. Peninsula Activities, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 656, 661, 93 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1971)).
108. Rossmoor, 13 Cal. 3d at 628, 532 P.2d at 99-100, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
109. Id. at 630, 532 P.2d at 101-02, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54.
110. Id. at 630-31, 532 P.2d at 102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
111. 20 Cal. 3d 798, 575 P.2d 1190, 144 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978).
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falling from a scaffold on a construction site. The plaintiff had stepped
on a plank incorrectly overlapped in the scaffold, which did not have
guardrails in place. A cause of action was brought against R. J. Novick
Construction Company, the general contractor, and in a trifurcated
trial, the jury found that Novick was negligent so as to have prox-
imately caused plaintiff's accident." I The jury further found that plain-
tiff's employer was negligent, and the court ruled in favor of Novick
against the employer on the cross-complaint for express indemnity.' 'I
One of the issues on appeal was the contention of the employer that the
conduct of Novick was active negligence, precluding recovery on the
cross-complaint." ' The argument made by plaintiff's employer on ap-
peal was that the job superintendent of Novick had a duty to per-
form a daily safety inspection of the premises and to report safety
hazards, which he detected and could not immediately remedy himself,
to a foreman for plaintiff's employer. ' Moreover, on the morning
of the accident the job superintendent for Novick had noticed that
the scaffold was not completed, but failed to take action himself or
to report that fact to the foreman for plaintiff's employer." 6 In holding
that this evidence did not compel a finding of active negligence on
the part of Novick, the court stated that the failure to discover
dangerous conditions would not preclude indemnity under a general
clause."I7 Furthermore, the Gonzales court stated that evidence in the
record indicated that while the job superintendent for Novick noticed
the condition, he had no reason to consider it dangerous, even if
his conclusion fell below the standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances."' The court also emphasized that the person seeking
indemnity did not participate in the conduct causing the injury.,'
In Armco Steel Corporation v. Roy H. Cox Company, Inc., 0 the
appellate court held that as a matter of law, appellant's conduct was
active.' Armco had employed Cox Company to clean and paint an
area at an Armco Steel plant. While painting a vertical duct within
a "bag house," which operated as a giant vacuum cleaner to filter
particles during the course of steel manufacturing, the ladder fell and
112. Id. at 803, 575 P.2d at 1193, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
113. Id. The express indemnity provision in Gonzales was a general indemnity provision.
See id. at 809, 575 P.2d at 1197, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
114. Id. at 810, 575 P.2d at 1198, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 810-11, 575 P.2d at 1198, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
119. Id.
120. 103 Cal. App. 3d 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1980).
121. Id. at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
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the Cox employee fell into an open fan sustaining serious injuries.
The evidence showed that the ladder fell because of vibrations caused
by the activation of a nearby motor. Armco had designed the filtra-
tion system, was aware that vibrations occurred in the area in which
the Cox employee was working, and had employees operating the filtra-
tion system. Moreover, Armco provided no warnings to Cox employees
that the system was about to start, and minutes before the accident,
Armco employees observed the Cox employee working on the ladder.
Nonetheless, employees of Armco activated the system and caused
the accident. The court stated that a reasonable argument could not
be made that the negligence of Armco was only passive since clear
evidence of affirmative activity was introduced.
2
The analysis of these cases establishes, therefore, that the question
of active or passive negligence is almost always one of fact. In analyz-
ing the issue, the factors outlined in Cahill should be considered as
guidelines.' 23 Clearly, the trier of fact in Rossmoor or Gonzales could
have determined that the conduct discussed was active. The tendency
to immediately label conduct as active or passive, however, should
be avoided. Since fixed rules do not exist, the facts weighed must
be investigated and analyzed thoroughly. Furthermore, legal factors
also are influenced by practical considerations.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
An understanding of the law governing express indemnity agreements
is indispensable to litigators as well as to drafters of indemnity
agreements. Attorneys drafting contractual agreements that contain
indemnity provisions must be aware that the provision should be
drafted in accordance with the Vinnell criteria. To be fully protec-
tive, the indemnity provision should expressly state that the indem-
nitee will be entitled to indemnification irrespective of whether the
indemnitee is actively or passively negligent.
In most cases, however, the indemnity agreement that the litigator
encounters will be one that is not so specific. In this case, the attorney
first should analyze the entire contract, focusing upon the indemnity
provisions. The crucial inquiry is whether the agreement contains a
general or specific indemnity clause, which in most cases is easy to
determine. A gray area will emerge, however, when the indemnity
provision is similar to that of C. L Engineers or when more than
one indemnity provision is included in the contract.
122. Id. at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
123. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
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If a specific or Type I agreement exists, the attorney representing
the indemnitee should take certain steps to protect and to perfect the
client's rights. First, a demand should be made immediately upon the
indemnitor for indemnity and defense of the action. The entire agree-
ment should be read carefully to determine whether more than one
indemnity provision exists in the contract, whether the contract pro-
vides for attorneys fees, and whether the indemnitor has agreed to
name the indemnitee as an additional insured under its insurance policy.
If the latter is the case and the indemnitor has obtained insurance,
this may provide additional impetus to the indemnitor and the carrier
to provide a defense and to agree to indemnify the indemnitee. If
the indemnitee is not insured and the indemnitor has secured insurance
for the indemnitee by means of an additional insured endorsement,
the carrier will be compelled to provide a defense and to indemnify
the indemnitee. The demand for defense and indemnification should
be specific and should clearly define the law and rights under the
contract. The demand further should advise the indemnitor, when
appropriate, that attorneys' fees will be sought. If product litigation
is involved, proper notice under California Commercial Code section
2607 also should be given.'24
Assuming the indemnitor fails to agree to indemnify and to defend,
defense counsel should attempt to establish through discovery that
the contract represents the full agreement and intent of the parties. I"
After establishing that the contract does represent the full agreement
and intent of the parties and that the contract was in full force and
effect, the attorney representing the indemnitee may be able to secure
an early ruling from the court through a declaratory relief action or
a summary judgment motion, entitling the indemnitee to indemnity
under the terms of the contract. If the contract calls for the indem-
nitee to be named as an additional insured under the policy of the
indemnitor and if the indemnitor has failed to obtain such insurance,
a cause of action for breach of contract should be included in the
cross-complaint. Requests for admissions should be structured to
establish such a breach. If the agreement is clearly Type I, the action
of counsel for the indemnitee should be aggressive and recovery of
attorneys' fees should be sought.
124. California Commercial Code section 2607 provides that when the buyer sues for breach
of warranty or other obligation for which the seller is answerable, the buyer may give the
seller written notice of litigation. If the notice states that the seller is allowed to defend and,
if the seller does not do so, that he will be bound in any later action against him by this
buyer, as to any facts common to the two litigations, then the seller is so bound, unless after
seasonable receipt of the notice he appears and defends. CAL. CoM. CODE §2607.
125. The court may consider parole evidence on that issue. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric
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Similarly, in the event a determination is made that the indemnity
agreement is a general one, a demand for defense and indemnifica-
tion should be made. Again, the contract should be read carefully
and analyzed in light of the factors discussed above.' The indem-
nitor also should be reminded of California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.6,' 7 in the event that the contract specifically does not
provide for attorneys fees. If the demand is rejected, discovery should
be undertaken to establish the same elements discussed in connection
with a Type I indemnity agreement. In addition, discovery should
be employed to determine whether and on what basis the indemnitee
claims the indemnitor was actively negligent.
In representing the indemnitor, the same basic analysis must be
undertaken. If the determination has been made that the agreement,
on its face, contains a specific Type I indemnity provision, counsel
must determine if any evidence supportive of an intent exists other
than what is expressed in the contract. If not, and the accident arose
out of the work covered by the agreement, defense and indemnity
should be assumed unless a valid question remains as to whether the
loss was caused by the sole negligence of the indemnitee. If some
doubt exists as to whether defense and indemnification should be
undertaken, counsel must weigh the possibilities of an adverse deter-
mination and decide accordingly.
If the agreement is general, counsel must carefully gather all facts
bearing on the active/passive distinction. While the question is, as
discussed previously, usually one of fact, all available evidence should
be weighed and a decision to defend and to indemnify necessarily
must be based upon the strengths and weaknesses of those facts and
a consideration of attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
An understanding of how to interpret and use express indemnity
clause provisions in contracts is helpful for practioners involved in
drafting construction contracts as well as for litigation attorneys. By
asserting an express indemnity provision, the parties to the contract
may agree that the risk of loss is borne entirely by one party to the
contract, regardless of how the loss is caused or who is responsible
Company v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 36, 442 P.2d 641,
643, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563 (1969); supra, note 29.
126. See supra notes 61-123 and accompanying text.
127. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.6 provides that a court may award
attorneys' fees to a person who prevails in a claim for implied indemnity, under certain condi-
tions, despite the lack of a contractual obligation to do so. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.6.
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for causing the loss. Consequently, the indemnitee may be indem-
nified even for losses caused by its own negligence.
To facilitate the interpretation of express indemnity clauses, many
California courts have applied the Type I, Type II, and Type III
classifications advanced in MacDonald & Kruse. These classifications
are helpful in assessing the effect of a particular indemnity clause.
The current trend of cases, however, creates doubt as to the con-
tinued validity of these classifications and suggests that the appropriate
approach to indemnity clause interpretation is to determine whether
the clause is general or specific, focusing on the intent of the parties
rather than on the MacDonald & Kruse classifications. Specific
indemnity clauses will be interpreted in accordance with the express
language contained in the contract. For example, an indemnitee may
be indemnified for its own negligence by expressly providing for such
indemnification in the contract. If the indemnity clause is deemed
to be general rather than specific, recovery by the indemnitee for its
own negligence will depend upon whether the indemnitee's conduct
is passive or active. If the conduct is active, the indemnitee will be
precluded from benefitting under the general indemnity provision.
An analysis of the cases suggests that the question of whether the
particular conduct is passive or active is almost always a question
of fact. The tendency to immediately place an active or passive label
on the conduct should be avoided. All of the facts and circumstances
must be thoroughly investigated and analyzed. Inexorable rules relating
to the nature of the conduct do not exist.
